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INTRODUCTION

When evaluating the enforceability of a non-compete agreement, courts
may employ the blue-pencil doctrine to strike out overly broad provisions,
while leaving the remainder of the terms in the contract intact. Non-compete
agreements containing restrictions upon an employee once the employment
relationship ends have become commonplace as employers seek to protect
their business interests and preserve their investment in human capital. 1 The
public policy behind the enforceability of such contracts is to "incentivize
(rather than deter) employers from hiring employees who might have access
to the employer's proprietary or confidential information." 2 Provisions
within non-compete agreements may include constraints on the former
employee such as the scope of the activity to be restricted, the geographic
location in which the activity is to be restricted, and the duration for which
the activity is to be restricted. 3 The enforceability of these terms is the
subject of considerable litigation.4
Whether drafting, seeking to enforce, or seeking to contest a noncompete agreement,5 a party must be capable of making a judgment
concerning not just the enforceability of the agreement as written, but also
concerning whether a court might enforce the agreement as modified by the

1.

Thomas H. Hogan, Uncertainty in the Employment Context: Which Types of

Restrictive Covenants Are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 429, 434 (2006); Katherine
V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership ofHuman Capital in the

Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REv. 721, 723 (2002).
2.
Justin C. Carlin, Non-Compete Agreements: A (Potentially) Enforceable, Effective
Way to Protect Your FloridaBusiness, CARLIN (Mar. 15, 2017), https://carlinfirm.com/non-

compete-agreements-apotentially-enforceable-effective-way-protect-florida-business.
3.

Hogan, supra note 1, at 436.

4.

Id. at 430.

5.
This Note will use the term "non-compete agreement" to describe such contracts.
For a definition of the term and list of synonyms, see Covenant Not to Compete, BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (A "covenant not to compete," also termed a
"noncompetition agreement; noncompete covenant; noncompetition covenant; restrictive
covenant; covenant in restraintoftrade;promise not to compete; contract not to compete" is a
promise, usually "in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not to engage in
the same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or
employer.").
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court ("blue-pencilling"), or might extend its judgment to an equitable
reformation-a substantive change to the agreement itself. While other
states have drafted statutes governing the enforceability of restrictive
covenants, 6 South Carolina's enforcement criteria is defined entirely by its
courts.' Clarity on this topic is important to contracting parties, but in South
Carolina, the common law offers more questions than answers.
Part I of this Note will introduce various approaches to non-compete
enforcement and the judicial scrutiny South Carolina courts traditionally
employ in reviewing such agreements. Part II of this Note will then dissect
the most pertinent recent authority on non-compete enforcement and provide
a comprehensive overview of the current state of the blue-pencil doctrine in
South Carolina. Part III discusses the policy considerations for and against
the blue-pencil doctrine and offers examples of how other jurisdictions have
proceeded. Finally, Part IV recommends that South Carolina adopt an
unequivocal stance on the blue-pencil doctrine by codifying its strict
common law approach in statute.
A.

South Carolina Treatment ofNon-Compete Agreements

By default, South Carolina courts review restrictive covenants with
skepticism.' Non-compete agreements are "generally disfavored and will be
strictly construed against the employer." 9 Indeed, judicial skepticism
towards employer efforts to restrict the activities of departing employees is
evident in the factors courts consider when evaluating such agreements. For
example, the enforceability of a non-compete agreement in South Carolina
depends on whether it:
(1) is necessary for the protection of the legitimate interest of the
employer, (2) is reasonably limited in its operation with respect to
time and place; (3) is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing
the legitimate efforts of the employee to earn a livelihood; (4) is

6.
Hogan, supranote 1, at 434.
7.
See discussion infra section III.C.
8.
Moser v. Gosnell, 334 S.C. 425, 430, 513 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating
that, "[g]enerally, covenants not to compete are looked upon with disfavor, examined
critically, and strictly construed.") (citing Cafe Assocs. v. Gerngross, 305 S.C. 6, 9, 406 S.E.2d
162, 164 (1991))).
9.
Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (D.S.C. 2003).
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reasonable from the standpoint of sound public policy; and (5) is
supported by valuable consideration.' 0
B.

The Differing Approaches that States Take to Enforcing NonCompete Agreements

Endeavoring to protect their legitimate business interests, employers
nationwide "may require their employees to sign a non-compete
agreement."" Despite the ubiquity of this practice, however, "no federal or
uniform law governing the interpretation of noncompetition provisions in
employment contracts across the country" currently exists.' 2 Accordingly,
"what is enforceable in one state may be prohibited in another."' 3
States vary greatly in the manner and degree to which they will enforce
non-competes. In some states, non-compete enforcement is determined by
statute, 14 while in others, like South Carolina, it is determined exclusively by
case law.' 5 This Note contends that, whether South Carolina precedent
explicitly recognizes the practice, its courts currently employ a strict
interpretation of the blue-pencil doctrine, which should be codified in the

10. Id. (citing Sermons v. Caine & Estes Insurance Agency, Inc., 275 S.C. 506, 508,
273 S.E.2d 338, 339 (1980); Rental Unif. Serv. of Florence, Inc. v. Dudley, 278 S.C. 674,
675-76, 301 S.E.2d 142, 143 (1983)).
11. Anthony Oncidi & John P. Barry, Noncompete Laws by State, XPERTHR,
https://www.xperthr.com/fifty-state-charts/noncompete-laws-by-state/25386 (last updated Oct.
1, 2018).
12. Id.
13. Id. See also Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative
Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, andImplicationsfor Employee Mobility
Policy, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 751, 756 (2011) ("State-based law in the United States governs
non-competes, as is the case with most of the law governing the relationship between
employers and their employees, employment contracts, and thus, contractual restrictions found
in the 'law of employee mobility."' (citing Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict
Trade Secret and Noncompetition Laws ObstructInnovation?, 1 ENTREP. Bus. L.J. 323, 323
(2007))).
14. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-50 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 99) ("The
General Assembly finds that reasonable restrictive covenants contained in employment and
commercial contracts serve the legitimate purpose of protecting legitimate business interests
and creating an environment that is favorable to attracting commercial enterprises to Georgia
and keeping existing businesses within the state. Further, the General Assembly desires to
provide statutory guidance so that all parties to such agreements may be certain of the validity
and enforceability of such provisions and may know their rights and duties according to such
provisions.").
15. David
Dubberly,
Non-Compete Laws:
South
Carolina, WESTLAW,
https://www.westlaw.com/9-517-382 1 ?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc. Default)
&VR=3.0&RS=cbltl.0 (last updated Oct. 9, 2018).
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form of a statute as the appropriate compromise among the available noncompete enforcement methods.
Of the numerous variations among states' non-compete laws, one of the
most significant is whether judges are permitted to reform overbroad
agreements. 16 States currently rely on three primary enforcement doctrines
for reviewing non-compete agreements: reformation, blue pencil, and red
pencil.' 7 Each of these doctrines provide courts with varying discretion to
"determine the impact on the enforceability of a non-compete provision that
includes elements that contravene state law."" As a result, an employer
needs to be aware of the non-compete laws in each state in which it employs
workers.
Additionally, employers who select another state's law in a choice of
law provision of an employee's non-compete should anticipate defending
that non-compete under multiple state laws. For example, in any South
Carolina enforcement proceeding courts will examine a selected foreign
state's law as well as South Carolina's own standards for non-compete
agreements. 19

1.

Reformation

Reformation is a doctrine prevailing in some states which enables courts
to rewrite a defective non-compete contract so as to render it nondefective. 20 Unlike the red-pencil or blue-pencil doctrines, which prohibit

16.

Christopher H. Lindstrom, State Specific Quirks May Thwart Unwary Employers,

NUTTER (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.nutter.com/non-compete-law-blog/state-specific-quirks-

may-thwart-unwary-employers.
17. THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE REFORM: A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO STATE
POLICIES
7
(Oct.
2016)
[hereinafter
NON-COMPETE
REFORM],

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/competition/state-by-statenoncompet
esexplainer unembargoedfinal.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
18. Id. at 7-8.
19. Stonhard, Inc. v. Carolina Flooring Specialists, Inc., 366 S.C. 156, 159, 621 S.E.2d
352, 353 (2005) ("Terms in a non-compete agreement may be construed according to the law
of another state. But if the resulting agreement is invalid as a matter of law or contrary to
public policy in South Carolina, our courts will not enforce the agreement.") (citation omitted);
Phillip Kilgore & Jeff Dunlaevy, Battle- Worthy Non-Competes: Lessons from the Wreckage of
Recent Cases, 19 S.C. LAW., 24, 27 ("Drafting counsel should advise their clients that they
may not rely exclusively on the law of the chosen jurisdiction if the non-compete portion of
the agreement may need to be enforced in South Carolina.").
20. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS:
ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 14 (2016) (noting that this doctrine is also
called "[e]quitable reform"). South Carolina has consistently repudiated reforming noncompete agreements through rewriting. See Poynter Invs., Inc. v. Century Builders of
Piedmont, Inc., 387 S.C. 583, 588, 694 S.E.2d 15, 18 (2010) (reiterating that the restrictions in
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2
adding new language, reformation "may entail insertions of new text." 1
This approach grants judges broad latitude "to amend the language in
question to generate an enforceable contract consistent with the original
intent of the existing contract." 22 In reformation states, "courts can use
discretion to rewrite offending provisions so that they conform to state
law." 23 For example, in a reformation state, a judge would be permitted to
rewrite language in a non-compete so that it is reasonable. Thus, a judge
could rewrite the terms of a geographic restriction to narrow the scope of the
constraint from a two-hundred mile radius to a fifty mile radius while
enforcing the remainder of the agreement as written.

2.

The Red-Pencil Doctrine

In states adhering to the red-pencil doctrine, courts can "nullify the
entire non-compete agreement if one of the provisions does not comply with
an existing statute or case law standards." 24 Courts in these all-or-nothing
jurisdictions "will neither revise nor eliminate any provisions of the
covenant," but instead "will simply determine the reasonableness of the
covenant as written." 25 Hence, an agreement will either stand or fall as
written under this take-it-or-leave-it approach, 26 meaning that the draconian
all-or-nothing rule invalidates the entire contract if any part of the noncompete agreement is determined to be overly broad.

a non-compete clause cannot be rewritten by the court); Stonhard, 366 S.C. at 161, 621 S.E.2d
at 354 (noting that the very act of adding a term not negotiated and agreed upon by the parties
violates South Carolina public policy); Lewis v. Premium Inv. Corp., 351 S.C. 167, 171, 568
S.E.2d 361, 363 (2002) ("It is not the function of the court to rewrite contracts for parties.").
See also Mailsource, LLC v. M. A. Bailey & Assocs., 356 S.C. 363, 369, 588 S.E.2d 635,
638-39 (Ct. App. 2003) (denying preliminary injunction enforcing non-compete agreement
because the non-compete term was about to expire, and the court could not "re-write the
parties' contract" to permit an extension).
21. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, supra note 20, at 14.
22. Id. Note that, in some cases, this doctrine is (confusingly) also referred to as "bluepencil." See discussion infra section II.A. 1.
23.

NON-COMPETE REFORM, supra note 17, at 8.

24. Id.
25. Jon P. McClanahan & Kimberly M. Burke, Sharpening the Blunt Blue Pencil:
Renewing the Reasons for Covenants Not to Compete in North Carolina, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1931, 1962 (2012).
26. Id.
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The Blue-PencilDoctrine

Blue-pencilling takes a middle of the road approach to non-compete
enforcement by permitting courts to excise overly broad language where
severable and enforce the rest of the agreement. 27 Originally, the blue-pencil
doctrine developed as state common law. 28 According to Black's Law
Dictionary,blue-pencilling ("the blue-pencil test") is defined as "[a] judicial
standard for deciding whether to invalidate the whole contract or only the
offending words." 29 Furthermore, the definition clarifies that, "[u]nder this
standard, only the offending words are invalidated if it would be possible to
delete them simply by running a blue pencil through them, as opposed to
changing, adding, or rearranging words." 30 Hence, judges employing the
blue pencil can strike through language, but cannot rewrite it.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

What is the State of the Blue-Pencil Doctrine in South Carolina's
CurrentLegal Landscape?
1.

The Implication of Poynter Investments, Inc. v. Century
Builders of Piedmont, Inc.: Non-compete Enforcement as a
Hobson's Choice in South Carolina

South Carolina law on defective non-compete agreements is unclear.
For example, in Poynter Investments, Inc. v. Century Builders of Piedmont,
Inc., 3 1 the South Carolina Supreme Court recently rejected the blue-pencil
doctrine altogether, suggesting that the practice is dead in non-compete
contract disputes. 32 However, numerous previous court opinions clearly

27. Kilgore & Dunlaevy, supra note 19, at 27 ("The term 'blue penciling' is derived
from the practice of 19th century British editors of using pencils with blue lead to edit
manuscripts.").
28. Lawrence J. Del Rossi, Part VII of "The Restricting Covenant" Series: Blue Pencils
and
Brokers,
NATIONAL
LAW
REVIEW
(Sept.
11,
2017),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/part-vii-restricting-covenant-series-blue-pencils-andbrokers.
29. Blue-Pencil Test, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
30. Id.
31. 387 S.C. 583, 694 S.E.2d 15 (2010).
32. Id. at 585, 694 S.E.2d at 16 ("Appellants also contend the trial court erred in 'blue
penciling' the contract by replacing the unreasonable territorial restriction in the agreement
with one of its own. We agree, and reverse."). While the court appears to clearly repudiate the
blue-pencil doctrine, it should be noted that this characterization conflates "rewriting" and
"blue-pencilling" as the same fimction. Rather than discussing rewriting and blue-penciling as
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suggest that this judicial tool still has a pulse.33 By ignoring previous South
Carolina Supreme Court cases discussing the blue-pencil doctrine as an
available tool-and a federal case permitting blue-pencilling under South
Carolina law the Poynter court created a discrepancy of authority that has
yet to be reconciled. Furthermore, under the circumstances of the case,
Poynter's holding indicates that South Carolina has in fact rejected
reformation, not blue-pencilling.3 4 Nevertheless, South Carolina courts and
practitioners applying Poynter are likely to interpret its decision as rejecting
both reformation and blue-pencilling-or to construe them to have the same
meaning.
In Poynter, the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the trial court's
enforcement of a noncompetition agreement against a former employee.35
Specifically, the court reviewed the trial court's decision to rewrite the
territorial limitation in the non-compete clause at issue. 3 6 The lower court
had removed language in the agreement that it deemed to be too broad, and
then inserted its own language for that of the parties.3 7 Ruling in favor of the
company, the trial court rewrote the territorial restriction to apply "within
Greenville County, South Carolina[,] and within an area encompassing
fifteen miles in any direction from [the premises]." 3 8 On appeal, the court
determined that the trial judge had exceeded his authority in "rewriting or
'blue penciling' the territorial restriction," reiterating its previous holding in
Stonhard, Inc. v. CarolinaFlooring Specialists, Inc. that allowed a court to
"insert a geographical limitation where none existed" would violate public
policy.3 9 Citing the holding of Stonhard, the court stated that "such a
reformation would be void, as it would add a term to the contract that the
40
parties neither negotiated nor agreed to."

Importantly, the court made no distinction between the practice of bluepencilling and rewriting, but instead seemed to conflate the two. 4 1 In doing

separate and distinct approaches, the court addressed them as one and the same in its holding
that "the trial judge exceeded his authority in rewriting or 'blue-penciling' the territorial
restriction." Id. at 587, 694 S.E.2d at 17.
33. See, e.g., Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681, 687 (D.S.C. 2003)
("Defendants contend that South Carolina does not permit courts to 'blue pencil' unreasonable
provisions of an agreement and enforce reasonable ones. A survey of South Carolina law
suggests otherwise.").
34. PoynterInvs., 387 S.C. at 588, 694 S.E.2d at 18.
35. Id. at 585, 694 S.E.2d at 16.
36. Id
37. Id at 587, 694 S.E.2d at 17.
38. Id. at 586, 694 S.E.2d at 17.
39. Id at 587-88, 694 S.E.2d at 17.
40. Id at 588, 694 S.E.2d at 17.
41. Id at 587, 694 S.E.2d at 17.
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so, Poynter ignored several decisions recognizing the use of the blue-pencil
doctrine to strike language as a separate and distinct judicial tool at the
discretion of South Carolina courts.42 Specifically, although the federal
district court's decision in Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet applied South
Carolina law to blue-pencil (and enforce) a non-compete agreement, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina neither mentioned nor cited the case in
its Poynter opinion. Without the context provided by this important
precedent, Poynter has created the illusion that non-compete enforcement in
South Carolina is essentially a Hobson's Choice4 3 and has become a
damaging red herring in South Carolina authority on blue-pencil
interpretation.
2.

Striking out Semantics: South Carolina Authority has not
Written Off the Blue-PencilDoctrine
a.

Rockford Manufacturing, Ltd. v. Bennet

Conspicuously absent from the Poynter decision, the federal district
court's decision in Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet provides arguably the
clearest delineation of the blue-pencil doctrine's application in non-compete
contracts in this jurisdiction. Relying on the logic of two previous South
Carolina Supreme Court cases, 44 the District Court for the District of South
Carolina concluded that, because the restrictive covenant at issue was
divisible (or severable), and because the contract included a severability
clause, the overly broad non-compete could be blue-penciled. 45 Perhaps
most valuably, the court defined blue-pencilling with specificity, noting:
Some courts have applied the so called "blue pencil test", that is, if
the excessive restraint is severable in terms, it may be disregarded
and the remaining part of the contract enforced; but if the contract is

42. See generally Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681 (D.S.C. 2003);
Eastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler, 258 S.C. 429, 189 S.E.2d 22 (1972); Somerset v.
Reyner, 233 S.C. 324, 104 S.E.2d 344 (1958).
43. An English university slang term, "Hobson's choice" refers to "the choice of taking
what is offered or nothing at all" and is supposedly a reference to Thomas Hobson (15441631), a "Cambridge stable manager who le[n]t horses and gave customers the horse next in
line

or

none

at

all."

Hobson 's

Choice,

DICTIONARY.COM,

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/hobson-s-choice (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). The phrase
was "popularized c. 1660 by Milton, who was at Cambridge from 1625-29." Id.
44. Eastern BusinessForms, Inc., 258 S.C. at 433, 189 S.E.2d at 23; Somerset, 233 S.C.
at 331, 104 S.E.2d at 347.
45. RockfordMfg., 296 F. Supp. 2d at 688-89.
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not severable in terms, the entire covenant falls. We recognize that
some courts apply the rule that if the restrictive covenant as to time
or space is unreasonable, even though indivisible in terms, it is
nevertheless enforceable for so much of the performance as would
be a reasonable restraint. These courts hold that the legality of
restraint should not turn on the mere form of the wording but upon
the reasonableness of giving effect to the indivisible promise to the
extent that would be lawful.4 6
Furthermore, the court directly addressed the defendant's contention that
South Carolina "does not permit courts to 'blue pencil' unreasonable
provisions of an agreement and enforce reasonable ones"; it asserted
confidently that "[a] survey of South Carolina law suggests otherwise." 4 7
Indeed, Rockford proffered two South Carolina Supreme Court casesEastern Business Forms, Inc. v. Kistler and Somerset v. Reyner-as proof
that South Carolina "ha[d] not wholly rejected the 'blue pencil' test,"
averring that "[b]oth cases can be reasonably read to conclude that although
an indivisible covenant may not be enforced to a reasonable extent, a
severable and reasonable covenant may be enforced independent of any
unreasonable provisions."48
In Somerset v. Reyner, the plaintiff sold his retail silver and jewelry
business and signed an agreement not to "engage in the business of retail
selling of jewelry, silverware, or similar items in the State of South Carolina
for a period of twenty (20) years." 4 9 The court considered whether to apply
the blue-pencil doctrine to the overly-broad territorial restriction but
ultimately determined that the indivisibility of the agreement prevented it
from doing so.5 0 Because the covenant "cover[ed] the entire State of South
Carolina" there was "no basis for drawing a sharply defined line separating
the excess territory."" Similarly, in EasternBusiness Forms, Inc. v. Kistler,
an employer sought to enforce a restrictive covenant preventing a former
salesman from selling "printing products of the type produced or sold by
[the employer]" for twelve months within a "100-mile radius of the City of
Greenville nor within a 100-mile radius of the central city of the assigned
territory of Salesman." 52 The question before the court was whether "the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 687.
Id.
Id.
Somerset, 233 S.C. at 328, 104 S.E.2d at 345-46.
Id. at 332, 104 S.E.2d at 348.
Id.
Eastern Business Forms, Inc., 258 S.C. at 433, 189 S.E.2d at 23.
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trial judge could, after holding that the 100-mile radius provision of the
contract was unreasonable, sever that part of the contract and enforce the
restrictive covenant contained in the contract only in the counties of
Spartanburg, Cherokee and Union." 53 The court determined that the
agreement "must stand or fall integrally" because the covenant was "clearly
indivisible" and like the restrictive covenant in Somerset-fumish[ed] no
basis for dividing [the] territory."5 4 In both cases, the court contemplated
severability as a pre-requisite for blue-pencilling the agreement,
demonstrating a willingness to use the doctrine where the terms are
divisible, or severable.
Regarding severability, the court in Rockford held that "[a] covenant is
severable only where it 'is in effect a combination of several distinct
covenants."' Furthermore, the court provided a valuable illustration of the
distinction between provisions subject to permissible blue-pencilling and
those that cannot be reformed.5 6 The court discussed the Eastern Business
Forms case as an example of the kind of provision that was deemed
incapable of being severed. 7 The limitation at issue in Eastern Business
Forms was a geographic territory restriction of a 100-mile radius that could
only be altered by substituting new language in the agreement identifying a
smaller geographic area.5" The court reasoned that blue-pencilling the
agreement was not an option because doing so would create a new term not
negotiated and agreed to by the parties.5 9 However, the relevant provision in
need of reformation in Rockford demonstrates why restrictions that may be
deemed excessive by a South Carolina court should be articulated in a
manner of easy divisibility. Where the employer's covenant protected a
listing of "Affiliated Companies," the court determined that the agreement
was enforceable because some or all of the "Affiliated Companies" could
simply be stricken from the list without adding or changing any existing
language.6 0 The court in Rockford expounded on the technical details of
severability in the non-compete agreement at issue:

53.
54.
55.
Somerset,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 432, 189 S.E.2d at 22.
Id. at 433, 189 S.E.2d at 23.
Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681, 688 (D.S.C. 2003) (citing
233 S.C. 324, 104 S.E.2d 344).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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First, the covenant is mechanically divisible. In the structure of the
covenant itself, Plaintiffs have manifested an intention regarding
each company individually, by choosing to list them by name. Such
an expression makes it possible, logistically, to extricate those
companies, without a legitimate interest, from the more global intent
concerning all "Affiliated Companies," while leaving intact the
covenant as to those companies which do have a legitimate interest,
knowing with full confidence that the intention of the parties has
been expressed and preserved in the remainder of the abridged
covenant. Accordingly, the covenant is potentially severable.
Second, the parties have expressly stated their intent that the
covenants be severable.61
Therefore, Rockford serves as a valuable example of applying South
Carolina law to blue-pencil an overly broad restrictive covenant and
demonstrates how the parties' intention to create a severable agreement
favors its use.
b.

Team IA, Inc. v. Lucas

Shortly after the Supreme Court of South Carolina's decision in
Poynter, the Court of Appeals had the opportunity to interpret the holding in
Team IA, Inc. v. Lucas.62 Reviewing a non-compete agreement between a
technology company and a former sales representative, the court determined
that a nationwide territorial restriction was overly broad on its face. 63
Interestingly, the court explained its understanding of the holding in Poynter
to mean that "a court may not 'blue pencil' the restrictions contained in a
non-competition provision by inserting or subtracting terms not agreed to by
the parties in order to make it valid and enforceable" and that "the parties
may not of their own accord convert an overly broad territorial restriction
into an enforceable one by entering into a subsequent agreement that
artificially limits the actual terms used in the parties' original contract." 64
The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the nationwide territorial
restriction was overly broad, but could be replaced with a narrower
restriction alternatively defined in a previous employment agreement,
provided that the restriction was "not overly broad after further development

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id
395 S.C. 237, 717 S.E.2d 103 (Ct. App. 2011).
Id at 246, 717 S.E.2d at 107.
Id
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of the facts." 65 Significantly, the Lucas opinion demonstrates how Poynter
blurred the lines between reformation and blue-pencilling for subsequent
courts.
c.

Palmetto Mortuary Transport, Inc. v. Knight Systems, Inc.

Quite recently, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in Palmetto
Mortuary Transp., Inc. v. Knight Sys., Inc.,66 had the opportunity to review
the Court of Appeals' Lucas decision to void a non-compete covenant's 150mile territorial restriction on the seller of a mortuary transport business. 67
Evaluating the analysis of the lower court, the Court observed that,
"[b]ecause South Carolina does not follow the 'blue pencil rule' and because
the non-compete covenant does not include a 'step-down provision,' the
court of appeals found it would be impermissible to redraw the Agreement
to include a smaller territorial restriction." 68 Using its holding in Somerset v.
Reyner for comparison, the Court stated that it had previously "declined to
apply the 'blue pencil test' to redraw a reasonable territory for the restriction
because the covenant was 'clearly indivisible' and 'furnishe[d] no basis for
dividing this territory. "'69 Furthermore, the Court reiterated its explanation
that it could not "make a new agreement for the parties into which they did
not voluntarily enter."

70

Overturning the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court found that
the 150-mile territorial restriction was not greater than what was essential for
reasonable protection of the rights purchased by the buyer and thus the
restriction was reasonable. 7 ' The Court took into account that the covenant
arose out of the sale of a business between two sophisticated parties that
were represented by counsel, that the buyer was required to purchase body
bags from the seller, who continued the body bag manufacturing aspect of
business, and that the buyer considered opportunity for expansion when
negotiating purchase of the business. 72
The Palmetto Mortuary opinion is significant because the court
entertained a discussion of what kind of agreements could be blue-penciled

65. Id.
66. 424 S.C. 444, S.E.2d 724 (2018).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 452, 818 S.E.2d at 729.
69. Id. at 455, 818 S.E.2d at 730; Somerset v. Reyner, 233 S.C. 324, 332, 104 S.E.2d
344, 348 (1958).
70. Palmetto Mortuary Transp., 424 S.C. at 455, 818 S.E.2d at 730-33; Somerset, 233
S.C. at 332, 104 S.E.2d at 348.
71. Palmetto Mortuary Transp., 424 S.C. at 458, 818 S.E.2d at 732.
72. Id. at 457-59, 818 S.E.2d at 731-32.
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to be enforceable and what kinds could not.73 This discussion is puzzling; if
the blue-pencil doctrine is not followed in South Carolina, as Poynter clearly
proffers, why did the court even bother to contemplate the presence or
absence of step-down provisions and the divisibility of the language in the
agreement as sine quae non to the court's facility to use the blue pencil? The
Palmetto Mortuary court's discussion of the blue-pencil doctrine matters
because it exhumes the practice as a discretionary tool at the court's
disposal, demonstrating that South Carolina's judicial willingness to modify
agreements through striking is alive and well under particular circumstances.
III.

ANALYSIS

This Note acknowledges that guidance on comprehensive restrictive
covenant reform to correct systemic inequity concerns inherent in labor
and employment dynamics-is beyond its scope. While it would be nafve to
embrace the strict blue-pencil doctrine as the nonpareil solution to noncompete litigation, South Carolina's capricious legal landscape leaves
parties waiting for the proverbial other shoe to drop they know only that
what is valid today may very well be invalid tomorrow. Codifying South
Carolina courts' apparent receptiveness to the strict blue-pencil doctrine in
statutory form would deliver clarity for all parties affected, without granting
excessive deference to employers or imposing an additional burden on
employees.
A.

What are the Public Policy Arguments Against Blue Pencilling?

Courts that have declined to blue-pencil non-competes have voiced three
primary apprehensions. 74 First, some courts have expressed concern that
blue-pencilling "is tantamount to the construction of a private agreement and
that the construction of private agreements is not within the power of the
courts." 75 Others have observed that blue-pencilling may create an incentive

for the employer to overreach and draft overly broad agreements, because
even if the non-compete is deemed unenforceably broad as drafted, a
narrower version could be substituted and enforced. 76 Finally, courts have

73. Id.
74. Maria Kalogredis et al., Addressing Increasing Uncertainty in the Law of NonCompetes, Ass'N CORP. COUNS. DOCKET, Apr. 2018, at 34, 36.
75. Id.; CAE Vanguard, Inc. v. Newman, 518 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Neb. 1994).
76. Kalogredis et al., supra note 74, at 36; Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972) (finding that "employers can fashion truly ominous
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further noted that, "for every covenant that finds its way to court, there are
thousands that exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect their
contractual obligations and on competitors who fear legal complications if
they employ a covenantor." 7 Opponents of the blue-pencil doctrine suggest
that "most employees simply comply with their non-competes rather than
challenging them in court," and thus "the law should provide a strong
incentive for employers not to overreach." 7 8
B.

What are the Policy Reasons that Favor Embracing a Strict
Interpretationof the Blue-PencilDoctrine?

The blue-pencil doctrine provides a realistic tool to aid courts in
resolving disputes where compelling interests exist on both sides. Despite
the critiques discussed above, the blue-pencil doctrine has many practical
advantages to recommend it-if only due to the shortcomings of competing
approaches.
For example, the all-or-nothing approach embodied in the red-pencil
doctrine may not actually operate as the powerful deterrent for employer
overreach that its proponents contend. 79 Because the reasonableness
standard is by nature nebulous, without hard-and-fast guidelines-or
concrete principles that could assist in deciding future cases or guide
employers who want to ensure that they draft reasonable covenants
employers are arguably put at a distinct disadvantage in drafting covenants
and "risk having the entire covenant held unenforceable on account of any
overbroad term." 0 Furthermore, the red pencil approach may engender even
further uncertainty in the law, as courts grapple with the undeniably "harsh
effects of its application."" This tension exists most prominently in
jurisdictions that have adopted the all-or-nothing standard of the red-pencil
doctrine because "there is no way for a court to enforce any part of a
covenant against an employee unless it finds the entire covenant to be
reasonable." 82 While courts are understandably inclined to consider the

covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and enforced when the facts of a
particular case are not unreasonable").
77. Kalogredis et al., supra note 74, at 36; Golden Rd. Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376
P.3d 151, 157 (Nev. 2016).
78. Kalogredis et al., supra note 74, at 36.
79. McClanahan & Burke, supra note 25, at 1965.
80. Id. at 1965-66.
81. Id at 1966.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
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equity of enforcing a restrictive covenant, their finding "ultimately should
rest on whether the covenant, as written, is reasonable." 8 3
The strict blue-pencil doctrine is plausibly the most practical
compromise among approaches to non-compete enforcement. The ability to
strike objectionable language with the blue pencil softens the harsh results of
the all-or-nothing approach "because it enables the enforcement of some
covenant restrictions against an employee despite the existence of overbroad
terms." 84 As a discretionary tool available to the courts, the blue-pencil
doctrine allows flexibility in non-compete enforcement that can ensure that,
in appropriate circumstances, "some employees will be held to reasonable
restrictions to which they agreed," and that courts may be alleviated of the
pressure to "uphold entire covenants in order to enforce particular
restrictions against employees.""
While proponents of the red-pencil doctrine assert that it is the most
consistent with general contract principles because any changes to contract
terms, even the striking out of unreasonable terms, would be contrary to
freedom-of-contract principles,8 6 the "limitations of the strict blue-pencil
doctrine ensure that the language enforced by a court is at least part of the
actual language agreed to by the parties." 7 The blue-pencil doctrine is
therefore more consistent with traditional contract principles than equitable
reformation of an agreement, which arguably creates an involuntary contract
containing terms not negotiated upon by either party." Jurisdictions that
embrace the strict blue-pencil doctrine and limit its application to divisible
or severable provisions have an even stronger case in this regard, especially
when the parties took care to draft the agreement specifically to permit this
type of enforcement with divisible language or step-down provisions. 89
For employers operating in multiple states-or simply for those
employing residents of South Carolina the vagaries in law across
jurisdictions underscores the importance of providing coherence on the everevolving landscape of non-compete enforcement. Parties seeking to enforce
or to challenge the use of these agreements are likely to be frustrated by the
rampant ambiguity in South Carolina law. The proponents of blue-pencilling
note that voiding an entire covenant because of modest overreach "would
frustrate the intent of the contracting parties," particularly given that "a

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 1967.
Id.
Id. at 1963.
Id. at 1967.
Id.
Id.
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reasonable time period or geographical area is not capable of precise
calculation." 90 Furthermore, the mere existence of a non-compete covenant
is "evidence of the parties' shared intent to impose limitations on the
employee's right to move to a competitor" and "an all-or-nothing approach
to enforcement may effectively frustrate that intent."91
Arguably, enforcement doctrines function as incentives to "use language
and terms that are less restrictive and more likely to stand up to judicial
review" for employers contemplating the use of restrictive covenants. 92
While the red-pencil doctrine goes furthest in limiting the use of noncompetes, giving employers in those states the strongest incentives to write
contract language narrowly and carefully, 93 consideration should be given to
the subjective nature of what constitutes reasonable restrictions on time and
geographic scope. The red-pencil doctrine means that one overly broad term
could void an entire agreement, effectively throwing the baby out with the
bathwater.
Applied strictly, the blue-pencil doctrine excises the objectionable
language only if it is possible to delete it simply by running a blue pencil
through it. This practice circumvents changing, adding, or rearranging the
words in a party's agreement. Importantly, the blue-pencil doctrine affords
the possibility that an overly broad provision in a restrictive covenant is not
necessarily always motivated by a sinister purpose. 94 Because its utilization
is entirely discretionary, 95 the court can evaluate the good faith of the

90. Health Care Fin. Enterprises, Inc. v. Levy, 715 So. 2d 341, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that declaring "the agreement void would frustrate the intent of the contracting
parties" and noting that "a reasonable time period or geographical area is not capable of
precise calculation").
91. Kalogredis et al., supra note 74, at 37.
92.

NON-COMPETE REFORM, supra note 17, at 8.

93. Id.
94. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for
Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REv. 672, 681 (2008) ("The blue-pencil
doctrine is based in large part on the 'understanding that there is not necessarily a sinister
purpose behind an overbroad restrictive covenant.' Courts can and do look to the good faith of
the employer in determining whether to utilize the blue pencil doctrine." (citing Reddy v.
Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 914 (W. Va. 1982))).
95. Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils:
Judicial and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 223, 251 (2007) ("Whether a jurisdiction uses
the blue pencil doctrine solely to eliminate an unreasonable term, or it allows a court to rewrite
the agreement, the doctrine is generally a discretionary tool."); see, e.g., Hilligoss v. Cargill,
Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 147 (Minn. 2002) (noting that the court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to apply the blue-pencil doctrine to make an agreement reasonable where the
employer asserted that it should have been used).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 6
934

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 917

employer in determining whether it is appropriate to exercise its option to
blue pencil or invalidate the agreement completely.
The presence of compelling policy interests on both sides requires a
reasonable and clear compromise. On the one hand, the blue-pencil doctrine
promotes public policy interests "in the ability of businesses to safeguard
their capital against pirating, counterfeiting, and unfair use by former
employees." 96 On the other hand, critics of the doctrine assert
traditional public policy interests "in the area of employee competition
covenants, namely, that individuals have a right to practice their chosen
trade and that society benefits from 'fair' competition." 97 Given that these
policy considerations will likely always be at loggerheads, South Carolina
should officially embrace the blue-pencil doctrine as a pragmatic approach
that embodies compromise and flexibility.
C. How Should South CarolinaStrike Out the Gray Area in the Law?
Although drafting non-compete agreements that are both reasonable and
enforceable under South Carolina standards will never be an exact science,
South Carolina authority's inconsistency on blue-pencilling creates gray area
that only serves to make the venture more frustrating and unpredictable than
necessary for practitioners. Because reasonableness is not a self-defining
standard, but rather varies with the specific circumstances and facts of each
case, determining enforceability is largely ad hoc.98 Poynter would indicate
that South Carolina courts may not blue-pencil or strike language in a noncompete agreement that is overly broad and severable. 99 However, South
Carolina courts appear to condone the practice of blue-pencilling
unreasonably broad provisions in non-compete agreements when the only
action required is to strike through the unreasonable provision. 0 0 While this
may seem like an exercise in semantics, the distinction between whether a
court repudiates the concept of blue-pencilling as a liberal tool of judicial
modification, capable of adding or rewriting terms as Poynter suggests, or
embraces it as a strict instrument to excise objectionable language where

96. Timothy D. Scrantom & Cherie Lynne Wilson, Postemployment Covenants Not to
Compete in South Carolina: Wizards and Dragons in the Kingdom, 42 S.C. L. REv. 657, 668
(1991).
97. Id.
98. Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906,911 n.4 (W. Va. 1982).
99. See generally Poynter Invs., Inc. v. Century Builders of Piedmont, Inc., 387 S.C.
583, 694 S.E.2d 15 (2010).
100. See generally Rockford Mfg., Ltd. v. Bennet, 296 F. Supp. 2d 681 (D.S.C. 2003).
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severable, as Rockford recognizes the doctrine, will likely be outcomedeterminative in many cases.
To evaluate how South Carolina should reconcile the vagaries of its
authority's interpretations on non-compete enforcement and modification,
consideration of other jurisdictional approaches as potential models provides
a valuable frame of reference. In recent years, "several state legislatures
have enacted statutes that govern some aspects of the enforcement of
covenants not to compete."'' These statutes serve several purposes:
First, they clarify the state's public policy position toward
covenants not to compete. Second, they affirm or occasionally
alter the common law rules that have developed regarding how
covenants are evaluated and enforced. Third, if the statutes are
drafted with care, they should produce more uniformity in judicial
decisions concerning covenants, thus bringing more predictability to
this area of the law."1 02

Accordingly, scrutiny of statutes adopted by other comparable states is
valuable in considering how South Carolina should proceed to bring lucidity
to its enforcement of non-compete agreements.
1.

Florida

Covenants not to compete in the State of Florida are governed by
statute, codifying the state's approach to the enforceability of such
provisions.1 03 To enforce a non-compete agreement, the statute employs a
two-step process. 104 First, the non-compete must be reasonable with regard
to time, area, and line of business.' 0 5 Next, in order to be valid, the party
seeking to enforce the non-compete must "plead and prove the existence of
one or more legitimate business interests justifying the restrictive
covenant."1 06 For reference, sections 542.335(1)(b)(1)-(5) provide a nonexclusive list of such "legitimate business interests."

101. McClanahan & Burke, supra note 25, at 1976.
102. Id. at 1976-77.
103. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg.
Sess. of the 25th Leg). For a discussion of this statute, see Carlin, supra note 2.
104. See § 542.335 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 25th
Leg).
105. Id. § 542.335(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 25th
Leg).
106. Id. § 542.335(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 25th
Leg).
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Furthermore, the statute delineates what is presumptively a reasonable
time period and what is not, creating a framework of guidance that gives
courts, and affected parties, a clear starting point. 0 7 The statute also enables
a court to modify the agreement to be enforceable, if possible. 08 The
reasonableness of the time restriction in a non-compete often depends on the
interest to be protected, and the statute establishes the presumptions which
courts must apply to the protection of different types of information.1 09 For
instance, most restrictive covenants-not based upon protection of trade
secrets or sales of an ownership interest in a business entity are presumed
reasonable in time if the restraint is less than six months; but the restriction
is presumed unreasonable if the restraint is more than two years in
duration." 0
Furthermore, the statute provides valuable guidance for the court's
interpretation. After the employer establishes reasonable restrictions to
protect its legitimate business interests, the burden of proof shifts to the
employee to establish that the restraint is overbroad, overlong, or not
reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest."' In
considering the employee's defenses, a court must construe a covenant in
favor of providing reasonable protection to all legitimate business interests
established by the employer.11 2 If the court finds the restraint overbroad, a
court may modify the restraint and grant only the relief that is reasonably
necessary to protect the interest. 113
Following the framework of Florida's statute, even when a court finds a
provision in a non-compete agreement to be unreasonable (such as an
unlimited geographic scope provision), the court should not strike down the
agreement entirely, but instead should enforce the agreement to the extent
reasonable and necessary to protect one or more legitimate business
interests. 114 The statute provides that, "[i]f a contractually specified restraint

107. Id. § 542.335(1)(d)-(e) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the
25th Leg).
108. Id. § 542.335 (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 25th Leg).
109. Id. § 542.335(1)(d)-(e) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the
25th Leg).
110. Id. § 542.335(1)(d)(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the
25th Leg).
111. Id. § 542.335(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 25th
Leg).
112. Id. § 542.335(1)(h) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 25th
Leg).
113. Id. § 542.335(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess. of the 25th
Leg).
114. PartyLite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1227 (M.D. Fla. 2012)
(noting that the absence of a "temporal duration on [a] covenant does not render it
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is overbroad, overlong or otherwise not necessary to protect the legitimate
business interest or interests, a court shall modify the restraint and grant only
the relief necessary to protect such interest or interests."" In most states
that have adopted the blue-pencil doctrine, modification is limited and
discretionary, not mandatory; however, Florida is an exception to that rule
by statute, and embraces the court's ability to reform a non-compete through
more liberal means that exceed the strict blue-pencil doctrine.
2.

Georgia

In 2011, Georgia passed the Restrictive Covenants Act,1 6 turning
Georgia from a non blue-pencil state which limited courts from modifying
the language used in a restrictive covenant, into a state where courts are
expressly authorized to modify a covenant that is "otherwise void and
unenforceable so long as the modification does not render the covenant more
restrictive with regard to the employee than as originally drafted by the
parties" in an overbroad restrictive covenant provision." 7 Prior to the
statute's passage, if one part of a non-compete was unenforceable, the noncompete provision would be struck down in its entirety."
In 2017, a federal court in Georgia interpreted the state's non-compete
statute and found the Act's definition of "modification" to be lacking.19 in
Georgia's first-ever published opinion analyzing how a Georgia court may
modify a non-compete clause that is overbroad after the statute's enactment,
in Lifebrite Labs, LLC v. Cooksey the court opined about exactly when and
how Georgia courts may modify overbroad non-compete provisions.1 20
The court in Lifebrite Labs, LLC v. Cooksey ultimately held that the
term "modify" means that, "[t]hough courts may strike unreasonable
restrictions, and may narrow overbroad territorial designations, courts may
not completely reform and rewrite contracts by supplying new and material

unenforceable" and that the "Court has the discretion to enforce it to the extent it is found
reasonable and necessary to protect one or more legitimate business interests").
115. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(c) (West, Westlaw through the 2018 Second Reg. Sess.
of the 25th Leg.) (emphasis added).
116. Jeffrey D. Mokotoff, Noncompete News: Georgia'sNew Restrictive Covenants Act,
FORD HARRISON, https://www.fordharrison.com/noncompete-news-georgias-new-restrictivecovenants-act (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
117. LifeBrite Labs., LLC v. Cooksey, No. 1:15-CV-4309-TWT, 2016 WL 7840217, at
*6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9,2016).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at *6-7.
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terms from whole cloth."121 The court relied on language in Hamrick v.
Kelley, the seminal ruling in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that
"the 'blue pencil' marks, but it does not write" "[i]t may limit an area, thus
making it reasonable, but it may not rewrite a contract void for vagueness,
making it definite by designating a new, clearly demarcated area."1 22
Finally, the court reasoned that nothing in the 2011 statute indicated that the
legislature intended to change Georgia's common-law approach to bluepencilling "other than to allow it in more circumstances."1 23 Thus, the court
held that the term "modify" used in O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(d) meant courts
should use the Hamrick approach: "Though courts may strike unreasonable
restrictions, and may narrow [overbroad] territorial designations, [they] may
not completely reform and rewrite contracts by supplying new and material
terms from whole cloth."1 24 As a result, the court found the noncompetition
provision in the agreement void and unenforceable because it could not
rewrite the contract to supply a missing geographical term. 125
The Lifebrite case makes demonstrates that Georgia employers must still
draft restrictive covenants carefully and narrowly.1 26 Indeed, although the
"live or die on its face" rules for restrictive covenants no longer exist, the
court was unwilling to rewrite the company's contract in order to correct its
mistake.1 27 Georgia's enactment of such a statute and the court's subsequent
application thereof signifies that the strict blue-pencil doctrine can function
as an effective check on employer strong-arm tactics by demonstrating that
employers should remain mindful of the inherent risks of drafting overbroad
restrictive covenants.
3.

How South CarolinaShould Proceed

South Carolina should look to the examples provided by its neighbors,
Georgia and Florida, and codify its own strict blue-pencil approach to noncompete enforcement in the form of a statute. Specifically, South Carolina
can emulate the constructive guidance in Florida's statute while rejecting the
broad mandate to reform non-competes to enforceability. Similarly, South

121. Id. at *7.
122. Id. (quoting Hamrick v. Kelley, 392 S.E.2d 518, 519 (Ga. 1990)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Jeffrey D. Mokotoff, Non-Compete News-Georgia Court Interprets Georgia's
Blue Penciling Statute, FORD HARRISON (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.fordharrison.com/noncompete-news-georgia-court-interprets-georgias-blue-penciling-statute.
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Carolina can learn from the judiciary's interpretation of Georgia's statute
and preemptively craft clear parameters for modification that are consistent
with the strict blue-pencil doctrine approach.
The option to blue-pencil agreements protects parties that are using
these agreements for legitimate purposes-like safeguarding customer
goodwill and confidential information who warrant the assurance that an
agreement that has been drafted and is subsequently judicially reviewed will
be enforced. By clearly and unequivocally adopting the strict blue-pencil
doctrine in South Carolina, courts will have discretion to review the
circumstances, hear the arguments, and decide that these parties did bargain
for some restrictions, and enforce those restrictions which the court deems
appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION

By adopting a uniform interpretation of the blue-pencil doctrine-and
defining when the court has the discretion to exercise it-South Carolina can
allow the most limited judicial modification of an agreement that preserves
the parties' intent and permits its enforcement. The current discord in state
legal authority benefits no one, and clarifying the law is in the best interests
of all affected parties to a restrictive covenant. While compelling policy
interests exist on both sides, courts should not allow the perfect to be the
enemy of the good in weighing the value of the freedom to contract and the
freedom of competition. South Carolina should embrace a pragmatic
solution to its incoherent precedent on non-compete enforcement; codifying
its current practice in statutory form is the best way to do so.
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